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The concept of citizenship is undeniably powerful. The terms “citizenship” and
“citizen” evoke notions of belonging, participation, equality, civic duty, democracy, and
virtually any other term associated with a well-functioning polity.1 In fact, the term
“citizenship” often serves as a shorthand reference to an abstract sense of civic virtue and
the right to exercise that civic virtue to shape the polity. 2 Citizenship, as popularly
imagined, is a fundamental element of our democracy. 3
These noble ideals, however, do not necessarily map onto any legal definition of
citizenship, nor do they accurately depict the experience of many U.S. citizens who find

*
D. Carolina Núñez is the Associate Dean of Research and Academic Affairs and a Professor of Law at
Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School.
1. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2008)
[hereinafter THE CITIZEN]; D. Carolina Núñez, War of the Words: Aliens, Immigrants, Citizens, and the
Language of Exclusion, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1548 (doing corpus linguistics analysis on the word “citizen”).
2. See D. Carolina Núñez, Mapping Citizenship: Status, Membership, and the Path in Between, 2016 UTAH
L. REV. 477.
3. See Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democracy and Citizenship of Women in the
Dayton Peace Accords, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 103, 127 (2001) (“Status as a citizen is ongoing; it is the permanent
truth of liberal democracy.”). See also James W. Fox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic Citizenship, and Welfare
Reform: The Troubling Case of Workfare, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 103, 135 (1996) (“Furthermore, in a democracy,
government is the one sphere founded on simple equality: the equality of equal citizenship.”); Kelsey M. JostCreegan, Debts of Democracy: Framing Issues and Reimagining Democracy in Twenty-First Century Argentine
Social Movements, 30 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 165, 181 (2017).
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themselves without equal access to the tools of civic engagement.4 Indeed, the gaps
between citizenship as we imagine it, citizenship as legally constructed, and citizenship as
we experience it are wide.5 Perhaps more concerning are the gaps between diverse groups’
conceptions of citizenship, both in their imaginations and experiences of citizenship.6 The
gaps between how insider groups and outsider groups imagine citizenship and experience
citizenship highlight the vast inequality of citizenship that has historically existed and
continues to exist in the United States.7 Carrie Hyde, Richard Sobel, and Kunal Parker
help expose and illuminate these gaps in their individual examinations of U.S. citizenship.
In Civic Longing: The Speculative Origins of U.S. Citizenship, Carrie Hyde brings
writings from a variety of genres together to extract a vision—or visions—of American
citizenship that predates any formal legal conception of citizenship.8 Hyde’s work is, at its
core, an in-depth analysis of the origins, both in time and conceptualization, of American
citizenship. Hyde focuses on the period of U.S. history between the American Revolution
and the Civil War, which comprise the formative years of American citizenship as an
abstract concept, if not a legal structure. Unfortunately, this time period often escapes the
serious consideration of citizenship scholars precisely because of the scant legal material
available. But Hyde recognizes that while these early years may provide little in the form
of legal citizenship structures, they are rich in its precursors: imagined citizenship. Thus,
Hyde successfully describes the early notions of citizenship that informed future legal
developments. She also hints at the gaps between this imagined citizenship and the realities
inherent in a slave nation.
Richard Sobel begins, analytically, where Hyde concludes, though in a modern legal
context. In Citizenship as Foundation of Rights: Meaning for America, Sobel examines
the ways modern legal structures meant to protect citizenship actually undermine the more
abstract notions of citizenship that gave rise to the formal legal structures in the first place.9
Sobel provocatively suggests that the citizenship of the American imagination is
distinctive and exceptional because it is based on a very real sovereignty of citizens. Laws
that require citizens to prove their citizenship prior to exercising the fundamental rights of
citizenship undermine that vision of citizenship. In essence, Sobel identifies a gap between
an imagined citizenship and citizenship as legally constructed.
Kunal Parker adds a layer to the conceptualization of citizenship in Making
Foreigners: Immigration and Citizenship Law in America, 1600–2000.10 While Hyde
builds a foundation for an imagined citizenship and Sobel addresses the gap between

4. See Stacy Hawkins, Diversity, Democracy & Pluralism: Confronting the Reality of Our Inequality, 66
MERCER L. REV. 577, 616–17 (2015); Núñez, supra note 2, at 490 (“Scholars have documented the myriad ways
in which U.S. citizens who are members of minority groups experience, as a matter of practical reality, limited
citizenship rights.”) (footnote omitted).
5. Claire Benoit, Force and Effect: A Look at the Passport in the Context of Citizenship, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3307, 3311–12 (2014).
6. Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship Through the Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1285, 1305–
06 (2002).
7. Id.
8. See CARRIE HYDE, CIVIC LONGING: THE SPECULATIVE ORIGINS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP 11 (2018).
9. See RICHARD SOBEL, CITIZENSHIP AS FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS: MEANING FOR AMERICA (2016).
10. See KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW IN AMERICA,
1600–2000 (2015).
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imagined citizenship and citizenship as legally constructed, Parker explores the gap
between how different groups experience citizenship. In his insightful history of
immigration and citizenship law, Parker highlights the ways in which the United States
transformed groups that were nominal insiders into outsiders.
When read together, these three authors’ works highlight our society’s and
government’s repeated and disappointing failure to live up to the citizenship of our current
and historical imagination. The authors, however, offer hope by illustrating the resiliency
of our imagined citizenship, its potential positive influence on U.S. law, and the prospect
of a narrowing gap in the way different groups experience citizenship.
CITIZENSHIP AS IMAGINED
In Civic Longing: The Speculative Origins of U.S. Citizenship, Carrie Hyde
undertakes the difficult but important task of examining citizenship as imagined prior to
the Civil War. Though the period between the Revolution and the Civil War constitutes
the primordial soup from which our modern legal constructs surrounding citizenship
would emerge, that period offers few descriptions of citizenship as a formal legal concept.
The Constitution scarcely mentioned the topic upon initial ratification. In fact,
“citizenship” is entirely absent from the document, and the term “citizen” appeared only
eleven times.11 We learn from those few appearances in the Constitution that citizenship
is a pre-requisite to certain political offices and a qualifier for access to certain courts. 12
Article IV gives a better glimpse into the importance, if not the contours, of citizenship:
“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States.”13
Congress had not done much to define who was a citizen besides undertaking the
Constitution’s grant of authority to create a “uniform rule of naturalization” with the
Naturalization Act of 1790 and subsequent amendments. 14 The courts engaged in some
efforts to sort citizens from noncitizens in the wake of the Revolutionary War.15 This is
not to say the concept of citizenship was outside popular cognizance or that we have
nothing to learn about modern citizenship from that time period. As Hyde elegantly
illustrates, the building blocks of citizenship as a concept existed in the popular
imagination and appeared in a variety of extra-legal sources.16 “The law may be the
official language of governance,” she notes, “but individuals are also governed by a

11. Further, citizenship was thought of as state citizenship until later in history. See United States v. Hall, 26
F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (“By the original constitution citizenship in the United States was a
consequence of citizenship in a state.”). See also PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY
AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2008) [hereinafter BEYOND CITIZENSHIP]; Peter Spiro, State Citizenship Has Roots in
American History, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017, 12:59 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/06/24/
is-state-citizenship-the-answer-to-immigration-reform/state-citizenship-has-roots-in-american-history.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
13. Id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
14. J. Allen Douglas, The “Priceless Possession” of Citizenship: Race, Nation and Naturalization in
American Law, 1880–1930, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 369, 384–86 (2005).
15. Carolina D. Núñez, Beyond Blood and Borders: Finding Meaning in Birthright and Citizenship, 78
BROOK. L. REV. 835, 858 (2013) (“[C]ourts sorted between citizens and noncitizens in the wake of the Revolution
. . . .”).
16. HYDE, supra note 8, at 43, 117.
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number of informal, extralegal traditions.” 17 Hyde examines “novels, tales, poems,
sermons, Bible translations, philosophy, political ephemera, legislative debates, and
unpassed bills”18 to paint an insightful picture of a nascent and fractured citizenship as
imagined in early U.S. history.
Civic Longing is extremely valuable for its exploration of genres that legal scholars
would not traditionally turn to when tracing the ancestry of our modern conception of
citizenship. These alternative sources offer some important insights into how imagined
citizenship affects the development of legal constructs. One of the most counter-intuitive
insights is this: Though citizenship is almost universally imagined in this period in terms
of belonging, inclusion, and civic virtue, these imaginations can nonetheless reinforce
structures to exclude individuals from the polity.
For example, Hyde juxtaposes two ways that Biblical traditions influenced
contemporary notions of citizenship.19 She shows how the citizenship ideal could be
anchored to heavenly citizenship through Christian nationalism, with the Bible serving as
an instruction manual of sorts for citizenship in the polity. 20 But a competing ideal of
Christian estrangement valued renunciation of worldly citizenship as a guarantor of
citizenship in heaven.21 In other words, the very condition of slavery and non-citizenship
ensured salvation in the after-life.22 Hyde notes the inherent problem in this imagination
of citizenship:
When heavenly citizenship is presented as a substitute for political citizenship, rather than a
model for citizenship in the state and/or nation, it ceases to be a catalyst to reform and,
instead, reinforces existing hierarchies by eviscerating the rationale for change. 23

This Christian-estrangement-based imagination of citizenship highlighted and
reinforced the enormous gap between how citizenship was imagined and how it was
actually experienced.24 While slave-owners and slaves alike claimed to aspire to this kind
of citizenship in an afterlife, the reality of the pre-Civil-War era was not egalitarian
belonging.25 The reality was far from the imagined ideal, with one group of individuals
legally owning the bodies of others. 26
In addition to the gap between how citizenship was imagined and how citizenship
was experienced generally, the gap between how slaves and free citizens imagined
citizenship also reinforced the disparity of experiences. While slaves might take solace in
the ideal of Christian estrangement, white Christian slaveholders imagined citizenship as
including an obligation in this life to Christianize their slaves.27
17. Id. at 11.
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 43.
20. Id. at 48.
21. HYDE, supra note 8, at 48.
22. Id. at 52.
23. Id. at 76.
24. Id. at 49–50.
25. Id. at 51–52.
26. HYDE, supra note 8, at 51–52.
27. See Marcus W. Jernegan, Slavery and Conversion in the American Colonies, 21 AM. HIST. REV. 504,
509–10 (1916) (explaining that religious leaders pushed to have slaves converted to Christianity commanding
the distribution of letters promoting conversion of slaves).
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For all of its problems, the notion of Christian estrangement, Hyde argues, did set
the stage for the emergence of an important element of imagined citizenship just prior to
the Civil War and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.28 Christian estrangement
gave rise to the idea that citizenship was something individuals chose, rather than
something that was ascribed to them. 29 This represented a significant break with notions
of ascribed citizenship that had previously governed in Britain.30 Citizenship was not just
a result of being born in certain geographical limits or to certain kinds of parents.
Citizenship meant something more substantive. Hyde goes on to distill this voluntary
element of the American imagination of citizenship from works by Nathanial Hawthorne,
who famously claimed, “I am a citizen of somewhere else.” 31 But here, again, the gap
between citizenship as imagined and citizenship as experienced is wide. And it may be
precisely this point, Hyde argues, that Hawthorne has in mind—though perhaps
subconsciously—in many of his works.32 Perhaps one of the most important conclusions
to be drawn from Hyde’s detailed analysis of early to mid-nineteenth century extra-legal
sources is that issues of consent were at the forefront of imaginative inquiries into
citizenship and the more abstract notion of belonging. Who decides whether someone
belongs and on what basis? May one relinquish belonging? Can one be exiled after once
having belonged, and on what basis?
Interestingly, Hyde begins her project with the intention of showing the reader what
citizenship meant in the pre-Civil-War imagination. But she does this by identifying the
elements that are absent from imagined citizenship—what it is not. Imagined citizenship,
much like the legal construct, is often easier examined with reference to what it cannot
protect and whom it cannot include. From Christian estrangement 33 to Hawthorne’s
artistic self-expatriation from political citizenship,34 to historic narratives of exile,35 and
beyond, Hyde must often construct imagined citizenship from imagined exclusion.
Hyde’s analysis is sophisticated and detailed. Her mastery of her selected sources is
impressive, and the conclusions she draws from these sources are persuasive. The
question, however, that Hyde leaves unanswered is the extent to which the imagined
notions of citizenship reflected or even drove popular contemporary understandings of
citizenship. Though Hyde observes that “individuals are . . . governed by a number of
informal, extralegal traditions,”36 she fails to address whether and how many of the
sources she selected percolated into and affected the development of popular
understandings of citizenship. This may simply be a function of Hyde’s skepticism toward
a historical contextualization that prioritizes a history divorced from contemporary artistic
sources.37 Or perhaps it is precisely the very detachment from reality that makes imagined

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

HYDE, supra note 8, at 45.
Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 18.
Id.
HYDE, supra note 8, at 47.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 16.
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citizenship worth exploring. It is that detachment from reality that creates the wide gap
between citizenship as imagined and citizenship as experienced and hopefully gives
citizens the motivation to propel reality toward something better.
CITIZENSHIP AS FORMALLY CONSTRUCTED (AND DECONSTRUCTED)
Though an aspirational imagined citizenship can be a driving force for reforms that
bring legal constructs closer to that imagined citizenship, sometimes aspirational imagined
citizenship can have quite the opposite effect. The more idealized the citizenship—or,
more specifically, the citizen—of popular imagination, the greater the temptations to limit
access to citizenship and reserve rights exclusively for citizens. Citizens are envisioned as
the civic elites, with rights that are unavailable to others. Citizenship becomes an exclusive
club to be guarded from imposters both to protect the citizenry and to protect the value of
citizenship itself. After all, the argument might go, of what value is citizenship if everyone
can have it or if it guarantees nothing that is not already available to everyone else?
The result is the modern obsession with identification and proof of citizenship.
Governments build legal structures to ensure that only citizens have access to the rights
associated with citizenship and to prevent noncitizens from fully participating in the polity.
In Citizenship as Foundation of Rights: Meaning for America, Richard Sobel argues that
these barriers to the exercise of rights impermissibly undermine and dilute an exceptional
American citizenship that differs from European citizenship in its “empowering” nature.38
Sobel goes so far as to say that identification requirements amount to forced
denationalization in the American context. 39
Sobel begins by identifying three fundamental rights of citizenship: the right to vote,
the right to work, and the right to travel.40 Sobel addresses each of these rights one by one,
relying on Supreme Court precedent, as well as legal commentary and political theory on
citizenship, to assert the fundamental nature of each right. Sobel’s descriptions of each of
these three rights offer very helpful catalogues of landmark Supreme Court decisions in
each of these areas and illustrate the connection between these rights and the concept of
citizenship. Interestingly, Sobel does not argue that these rights are necessarily exclusive
to citizenship, but that they inhere in citizenship. In doing this, Sobel raises some
interesting questions about the very nature of citizenship. Is citizenship defined by the way
that rights attach rather than by the specific rights that attach? Can a government offer any
of the rights inherent in citizenship to other individuals within the polity by specific act?
Can citizenship be unbundled and divided by an individual citizen’s consent? 41 These are
not questions that are ultimately necessary to Sobel’s analysis, though the answers to these
questions might have provided additional context to his conclusion.
Sobel’s thesis is that the modern identification regime, in which government entities
38. See SOBEL, supra note 9, at 131–50.
39. Id. at 8.
40. See Id. at 38–57 (discussing the Right to Vote); id. at 58–71 (discussing the Right to Employment); id. at
72–108 (discussing the Right to Travel).
41. Sobel’s discussion regarding the nature of citizenship raises questions addressed by other authors. See
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296 (1951) (arguing that citizenship is “the right to have
rights”); see also AYTEN GUNDOGDU, RIGHTLESSNESS IN THE AGE OF RIGHTS: HANNAH ARENDT AND THE
CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLES OF MIGRANTS (2015).
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ask citizens to prove their citizenship prior to exercising the fundamental rights of
citizenship he has identified, impermissibly infringes on citizenship. 42 Sobel’s arguments
in support of this thesis fall into two modes, and Sobel seems to sometimes blur the line
between them.
At times, Sobel’s critique is a constitutional one. Requiring proof of citizenship, he
argues, conflicts with the constitutional guarantee of equal protection or the guarantee of
privileges and immunities.43 To put it more abstractly, this argument is about
inconsistencies between two legal constructs surrounding citizenship—identification laws
and the Constitution.44 These kinds of arguments are attractive because they are anchored
to familiar cases and follow a predictable format that is the bread and butter of litigation.
These are, indeed, the kinds of arguments that courts are interested in. When Sobel’s
arguments fall in this mode, he provides an instruction manual for challenging
identification laws in court.
Far more interesting, though, is what could be described as an argument about the
gap between imagined citizenship and the formal legal constructs surrounding citizenship.
Sobel argues that an identification regime is inconsistent with the theoretical and historical
underpinnings of U.S. citizenship.45 This argument focuses on the ways in which requiring
proof of citizenship undermines a more abstract—or imagined—notion of American
citizenship.46 When Sobel writes in this mode, he suggests that the very act of requiring
citizens to produce proof of citizenship inverts the American democratic enterprise.
Citizens, he argues, should require the government to prove that an individual is not a
citizen before stripping a citizenship right. 47 Citizens must hold the government
accountable to them in a truly democratic government. 48
Identification regimes . . . threaten the sovereignty of citizenship and self-government . . . .
The policy consequences of making citizen[s] voting rights contingent, for instance, on
identification documents constitute constructive disenfranchisement and denationalization
by the state selecting which citizens can participate in elections. Identification regimes
accomplish what government laws may not otherwise do: stripping citizens of their
citizenship rights prior to producing identification, the constructive equivalent of
denaturalization or exile.49

This argument is provocative and insightful. Much of this relationship is premised
on the nature of birthright citizenship, whether jus soli or jus sanguinis. The government
cannot and does not control birthright citizenship—individuals are born with no planning
or direction from the government. The government must nonetheless remain accountable
to anyone born into the status. Likewise, the government cannot remove birthright
citizenship from an individual; citizens can only be expatriated voluntarily. 50 This, Sobel
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

SOBEL, supra note 9, at 2.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id. at 110–15.
SOBEL, supra note 9, at 115–20.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 12
NUNEZ, C-FINAL COPY (DO NOT DELETE)

308

2/15/2019 3:23 PM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:301

argues, is at the core of an empowering citizenship in which citizens may exercise
fundamental citizenship rights “per force.”51
Equally intriguing is Sobel’s suggestion that American citizenship is peculiar and
distinctive in its “empowering” nature.52 Sobel presents a vision of American citizenship
that elevates the individual over the government in a way that European citizenship, for
example, does not.53 American citizenship, he argues, is unique and exceptional and
demands more from the government: “Because of the differences in the nature of other
governments and their relationships to their citizens and subjects, the argument that people
in other democratic countries have to carry and show identification does not support the
proposition that this should occur here.”54
The distinction between a peculiarly American notion of citizenship and that of other
democratic countries is not entirely clear, however. Sobel first argues that European
citizenship is different from American citizenship because European states developed
from “monarchical autocratic and authoritarian regimes.” 55 Sobel then catalogues various
countries’ identification laws, but those examples raise more universal concerns about
identification laws that are not tied to any particular abstract conception of citizenship.56
Sobel critiques almost every example he raises as inimical to fundamental democratic
ideals.57 In that sense, it seems Sobel’s real argument is that identification regimes are at
odds with a universal, core conception of citizenship, rather than with a peculiar American
brand of citizenship.58
The lack of clarity in this piece of the argument does not undermine the larger point
that modern legal developments are inconsistent with a more abstract notion of American
citizenship. Sobel’s claim provocatively advances our understanding of American
citizenship and hints at a re-imagination of citizenship—one based on its forgotten
historical foundations—that could potentially call into question many legal constructs
beyond those addressed in his book. Sobel’s argument, at its core, is a call to narrow the
gap between an imagined citizenship ideal and the formal legal constructs that shape
experienced citizenship. Sobel’s work reinvigorates the citizenship inquiry and invites
further discussion.
CITIZENSHIP AS (UNEQUALLY) EXPERIENCED
Though the gap between imagined citizenship and citizenship as legally constructed
can be wide, the rift between these two facets of citizenship and the everyday experience
of citizens can be enormous. Our legal constructs often fail to live up to the idealized
citizenship of our imagination. This is, in part, what Richard Sobel highlights in
Citizenship as Foundation of Rights. But legal structures, even if approaching consistency

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 7.
SOBEL, supra note 9, at 7–8.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 132–48.
SOBEL, supra note 9, at 132–48.
Id. at 132–50.
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with our imagined citizenship, often fail to protect individuals’ exercise of citizenship. As
a result, the lived experience of citizenship falls miserably short of the citizenship
nominally guaranteed by law, as well as the idealized citizenship of our imagination. That
this failure of citizenship most often affects women, people of color, and other
marginalized groups exposes a particularly pernicious citizenship gap—the gap between
how the privileged experience citizenship and how minority groups experience
citizenship—that pushes groups into second-class citizenship.
In Making Foreigners: Immigration and Citizenship Law in America, 1600-2000,
Kunal M. Parker exposes the enormity of this gap and shows how sometimes this gap is
more accurately described as a chasm that strips marginalized groups of their very
citizenship: “Second-class citizenship can shade off, and all too frequently has shaded off,
into formal non-citizenship, into genuine foreignness.” 59 Parker documents a history that
is at once familiar in the events and practices he describes but novel in the insights it offers.
In reading Making Foreigners, the reader must come to terms with a historical reality
that is at odds with the popular narrative of the United States as a country of immigrants.
The claim that the exclusion of outsiders is an important facet of American history is
certainly not new. Indeed, the scholarship on U.S. immigration history is rich with
examples of efforts to stop people from arriving on U.S. shores. 60 But Parker takes a
different approach. Rather than focusing his lens on groups the United States has excluded
from its shores, he traces the historical experience of groups with legitimate claims to
membership that the U.S. government nonetheless marginalized and treated as outsiders:
“Readers will readily understand the concept of the country’s absorption and rejection of
outsiders,” Parker writes.61 “They might find rather more unfamiliar the concept of
rendering insiders foreign.” 62
This approach allows Parker to bring together the experiences of American Indians,
Black Americans, women, Asian Americans, Latino Americans, and the poor under a
single analytical framework. To be clear, Parker’s claim is not that he has uncovered new
historical sources that reveal events and circumstances previously unknown. The events
that Parker describes are well documented and appear in a variety of scholarly
commentaries.63 The real value in Parker’s approach is that it persuasively connects these
events and experiences in a meaningful way. As Parker joins these histories, which are
conventionally relegated to separate tomes, the U.S. practice of targeted and intentional
marginalization of minority groups comes into sharp focus. And while Parker’s
conceptualization of the past is insightful on its own, the context it provides to the modern
immigration enforcement regime is crucially important:

59. PARKER, supra note 10, at 8.
60. See Ernesto Hernández-López, Global Migrations and Imagined Citizenship: Examples From Slavery,
Chinese Exclusion, and When Questioning Birthright Citizenship, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 255 (2008);
Denny Chin & Kathy Hirata Chin, Asian Americans and the Law, 11 JUD. NOTICE 6 (2016).
61. PARKER, supra note 10, at 4.
62. Id.
63. See Rose Weston, Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Commission Model to the
Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1017 (2001) (criticism
of treatment of Native Americans); Brando Simeo Starkey, Jim Crow, Social Norms, and the Birth of Uncle Tom,
3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 69 (2013) (criticism of treatment of black citizens).
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As we look over the long span of American history, we see the multiple uses to which the
category of “alien” has been put, not as simple reflections of the “fact” that an individual is
from elsewhere, but rather as active strategies of management, control, and subordination.
Given the fact that those once aliens are now citizens, that “we” were once “them,” might
“we” identify differently with “them”? How might this lead us to rethink our responsibility
to the immigrants in our midst and at our border?64

Parker begins his book by drawing an analytical line between the U.S. government
excluding outsiders on the one hand and the government “making foreign” (or forcibly
estranging) insiders on the other hand. This distinction, Parker argues, allows him to
connect various histories of marginalization and mistreatment of groups that are now
formally and substantively recognized as citizens and members of the polity.65 This
analytical framework is largely very successful as a means of organizing the narrative. On
occasion, though, the framework sometimes obscures the larger point that Parker makes—
that the marginalization of groups inside of the United States is not very different from the
physical exclusion of outsiders. Some readers might be confused and distracted by the
conceptual premise that the groups Parker describes are insiders, rather than outsiders.
Part of this confusion may be a result of a somewhat fuzzy line between who is an
insider and who is an outsider. At times, Parker seems to define “insider” as anyone
physically present within the territory of the United States. 66 At other times, Parker
suggests that it is birth within the territory67 or citizenship68 that makes someone an
insider. While the contours of outsider status are largely irrelevant to Parker’s larger goal,
the lack of clarity risks undermining some of the examples presented in the book.
One group that Parker describes as having undergone forced estrangement was
arguably not really an insider group to begin with under any sound definition of that term.
American Indians had neither formal membership (through citizenship or otherwise) nor
de facto membership (through the extension of rights) in the American polity until at least
1924, when Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act. 69 In fact, American Indians
guarded their noncitizen status as a way of preserving some sense of sovereignty, and the
U.S government rationalized its legal and physical marginalization of American Indians
based on their very status as noncitizens.70 Parker recognizes this formal noncitizen status
but treats it as a kind of legal fiction. 71
But this treatment of American Indians as outsiders was more than formal—tribes
were substantive outsiders, whether as allies or as enemies of the U.S. government,
depending on what was advantageous for the government at the time, even before the

64. PARKER, supra note 10, at 225.
65. Id. at 16.
66. Id. at 17 (distinguishing between those “on the territorial outside and the territorial inside”).
67. Id. at 19.
68. Id. at 7.
69. See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans:
Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 107, 124 (1999); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes,
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 247 (2002).
70. PARKER, supra note 10, at 60.
71. Id. at 131.
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Revolution.72 In fact, that American Indians and immigrants have had to contend with the
plenary power doctrine suggests these groups’ commonality as outsiders. 73 The
government might more accurately be described as having historically constructively
excluded them as outsiders rather than as having “render[ed] insiders foreign.” 74 Again,
the designation of American Indians as insiders is quite unnecessary to Parker’s larger
point about the American conception of aliens and citizens, which is why Parker’s strict
adherence to his framework exceeds its usefulness in certain instances.
But these instances of historical examples undermining the framework are vastly
outnumbered by historical practices and events that clearly fit into Parker’s analytic
framework. The experience of Japanese Americans during World War II is a paradigmatic
example of an insider group being rendered foreign. The U.S. government’s removal of
Japanese American families to internment camps 75 amounted to a de facto
denaturalization, if not a legal one. The targets of the government’s efforts included
citizens of the United States, many of whom had children serving in the U.S. armed
forces.76 They were formal and substantive citizens who had, up to that point, considered
themselves to be fully entitled to every right offered to any other citizen of the United
States. But these citizens were deported from their homes in much the same way
immigrants—noncitizens—are deported from the United States.77 Likewise, women’s
experiences of citizenship map perfectly onto Parker’s framework. The early 20th century
expatriation of women upon their marriage to a noncitizen, for instance, is an obvious
example.78 In this case, the government stripped women’s formal citizenship against their
will and without their consent.79 This is the very essence of making insiders foreign.
Ultimately, Parker succeeds in a massive undertaking. He recounts a 600-year
history of the United States under a framework that brings new insights into the past and
the future. Parker shows how the United States has drawn and redrawn the lines that
separate insiders from outsiders whether on the “out” side of the border or on the “in” side.
Often, the lines have been race-based, and those lines have affected immigrants and people
within territorial borders alike, with individuals being denied entry based on race and
individuals within our borders being denied naturalization based on race.80 Sometimes the
72. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25–80 (1999); Patrick Wolfe, Settler
Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. GENOCIDE RES. 387 (2006).
73. See Cleveland, supra note 722.
74. PARKER, supra note 10, at 10.
75. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
76. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Outside Citizens: Film Narratives About the Internment of Japanese
Americans, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 769, 772 (2009).
77. See Mark D. Friedman, Say “Cheese.” Uncle Sam Wants Your Photograph and Fingerprints or You Are
Out of Here. Does America Have A Peace Time Constitution in Danger of Being Lost?, 30 NOVA L. REV. 223,
252 (2006).
78. PARKER, supra note 10, at 177.
79. Id.
80. For general descriptions of Chinese exclusion and prohibition on naturalization for Asian immigrants,
see Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false
&doc=47 (last visited Sep. 6, 2018); see also Chinese Immigration and the Chinese in the United States,
NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/research/chinese-americans/guide (last visited Sep. 6, 2018);
see also The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act (last visited Sep. 6, 2018).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2018

11

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 12
NUNEZ, C-FINAL COPY (DO NOT DELETE)

312

2/15/2019 3:23 PM

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:301

distinctions have been based on gender, social class, or political opinion. Those lines too
have cut across and beyond U.S. territory as bases for excluding individuals from the
United States81 or marginalizing them when we cannot otherwise remove or ignore
them.82
Today, the lines between citizen and noncitizen are stark. Noncitizens have been
banned from traveling to the United States based on criteria that would be constitutionally
infirm if applied to citizens. 83 Noncitizens within U.S borders, especially those without
formal authorization to be in the United States, likewise find their rights abridged in ways
that citizens rights’ cannot be.84 Undocumented immigrant refugee families are now
routinely detained in facilities owned and operated by corrections companies. 85 The recent
separation of immigrant children from their parents as a deterrent to further undocumented
immigration will leave a lasting scar on our history. 86 Perhaps our past can lead us to reexamine our current treatment of aliens. If we recognize that the lines we have historically
drawn between insiders and outsiders—citizens and aliens—have often merely been
convenient tools to marginalize minority groups, then how might we avoid that very result
in our current line-drawing? Parker offers some hope in his Coda, where he mentions the
national DREAMer movement.87 Young people, Americans in everything but formal

81. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798–99 (1977) (denying entry based on gender); Kleindienst v
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (denying entry based on political opinion).
82. PARKER, supra note 10, at 7 (describing the “poor laws that did not adequately distinguish between the
native-born poor and the foreign-born poor”). See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (discussing
McCarthy era practices).
83. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (the travel ban case denying entry based on national origin).
84. See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization
and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. The exclusion
of aliens and the reservation of the power to deport have no permissible counterpart in the Federal Government’s
power to regulate the conduct of its own citizenry. The fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens differently from
citizens does not in itself imply that such disparate treatment is ‘invidious.’”); Michael Kagan, When Immigrants
Speak: The Precarious Status of Non-Citizen Speech Under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2016)
(discussing and advocating a change in the ways immigrants’ and non-citizens’ first amendment rights are
abridged); Victor C. Romero, Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment: Undocumented Immigrants’ Rights
After INS v. Lopenz-Mendoza and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999, 1000–03 (1992)
(“While many [undocumented immigrants] seek acceptance by the majority, the new immigrants find that their
undocumented status bars them from free association with mainstream society.”).
85. See Rebeca M. López, Codifying the Flores Settlement Agreement: Seeking to Protect Immigrant
Children in U.S. Custody, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1635, 1658 (2012); see also Wil S. Hylton, The Shame of America’s
Family Detention Camps, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/theshame-of-americas-family-detention-camps.html.
86. For Jeff Sessions’ rationale of deterrence in his press conference, see Hugh Hewitt, US Attorney General
Jeff Sessions on Children Separated from Parents at Border, F-1 Visas for PRC Students, and Masterpiece
Cakeshop Decision, HUGH HEWITT (June 5, 2018), http://www.hughhewitt.com/attorney-general-jeff-sessionson-the-immigration-policies-concerning-children-apprehended-at-he-border-and-f-1-visas/ (“[I]t’s legitimate to
warn people who come to the country unlawfully bringing children with them that they can’t expect that they’ll
always be kept together.”); Eli Rosenberg, Sessions Defends Separating Immigrant Parents and Children:
‘We’ve Got to Get This Message Out,’ WASH. POST (June 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2018/06/05/sessions-defends-separating-immigrant-parents-and-children-weve-got-to-get-thismessage-out/?utm_term=.087fe2aee8da; see also Miriam Jordan et al., As Migrant Families Are Reunited, Some
Children Don’t Recognize Their Mothers, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/10/us
/politics/trump-administration-catch-and-release-migrants.html; César Cuauhtémoc Garcia Hernandez, Cruel
and Immoral: America Must Close the Doors of Its Immigration Prisons, GUARDIAN (June 17, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/17/family-separation-family-detention-immigration.
87. PARKER, supra note 10, at 230.
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status, challenged the conventional assumption that noncitizens do not belong. It has been
three years since the publication of Parker’s book, and the DREAMer movement has not
led to lasting immigration reform. But that the movement emerged and that it continues to
drive discussion about membership and belonging is a silver lining.
CONCLUSION: MINDING THE GAPS
Hyde, Sobel, and Parker each make significant contributions to our understanding
of citizenship, membership, and belonging. When read together, though, their books offer
much more than that. They highlight the gaps between the imagined citizenship ideal and
the legal structures surrounding citizenship, as well as the every-day lived experience of
citizenship. The challenge is to mind those gaps—how can the gap between imagined
citizenship and experienced citizenship be managed so that the noble citizenship ideal is
an empowering force for continued improvement? Perhaps we can learn from our
mistakes.
In executing the order that authorized Japanese internment—a de facto mass
deportation of American citizens—during World War II, General John DeWitt offered a
response to the argument that this was an impermissible undermining of citizenship: “It
makes no difference whether [a person of Japanese descent] is an American citizen, he is
still a Japanese [sic]. American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty.” 88
DeWitt’s comment returns us to the gap between citizenship as imagined, citizenship as
legally constructed, and citizenship as experienced. DeWitt alludes to a noble imagined
conception of citizenship in which the citizen exhibits a fundamental civic virtue—loyalty.
DeWitt was right that formal citizenship does not guarantee loyalty of the imagined
citizenship ideal. DeWitt was wrong, however, about what that meant about Japanese
Americans. The legal structures that confer the status of citizenship do not—and could
not—adequately determine who is and who is not loyal, regardless of race. Citizenship
status never guarantees loyalty from anyone. This is the gap between the imagined
citizenship ideal and the legal structures that surround citizenship. DeWitt’s—and our
country’s—failure was in allowing the gap to be a vehicle for wartime suspicions, racial
bias, and forced internment of American citizens.
This is perhaps the most dangerous potential result of the gap between a lofty
imagined citizenship and the legal structures of citizenship. There is a tension between the
lofty ideals of citizenship as we imagine it and the principles of equality that we associate
with that imagined concept. The higher the pedestal on which the imagined citizenship
sits, the larger the risk that we use the almost other-worldly vision of citizenship to exclude
people from citizenship based on biases. The more lofty the ideal, the more likely we are
to believe that some category of people is unfit, and humans are notorious in their
substitution of biases for more principled judgment. Citizenship, it seems, is as much a
tool of exclusion as it is of inclusion. This is a gloomy forecast for the future.

88. Id. at 180 n.57 (citing Testimony of Lt. General John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of Western
Defense Command, Investigation of Congested Areas, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of Navel Affairs, House
of Representatives, Seventy-eighth Congress, First Session Pursuant to H. Res. 30, A Resolution Authorizing and
Directing an Investigation of the Progress of the War Effort, pt. III (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1943).
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But the gap between a lofty citizenship ideal can also serve as an aspirational model
in which we continually strive to make citizenship the egalitarian and empowering concept
of our imagination. Our track record suggests that this has often been the case. That more
people have been able to access citizenship and that increasing numbers of those citizens
have been able to exercise their rights, even if only after hard-won battles, suggests that
citizenship endures in our imaginations as a noble, inclusive ideal that empowers its
recipients with the right and obligation to make the United States better. Our failures have
been tragic, but our trajectory is hopeful. Pursuing citizenship as we imagine it may be our
best hope to redeem our past failures and avoid new ones. Citizenship as imagined
promises nothing, of course, but it certainly offers a goal. And perhaps that is enough.
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